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Although mediators often think of themselves as advancing a positive and progressive 
orientation to conflict, mainstream facilitative mediation practice subordinates conflict to 
harmony and does not recognize non-Western orientations to disputing. This is closely 
related to a lack of awareness and recognition of different ways of being or versions of 
selfhood. In Western mediation practice, conflict and violence are typically seen as 
destructive and unhelpful ways of being, and this does not allow for the constitutive and 
productive role of conflict in many non-Western traditions. The playing out of these 
assumptions in mediation practice effects an operation of power, which is particularly 
significant in intercultural mediations. These intercultural situations and the 
accompanying operation of power arise regardless of whether the dispute is among 
people of similar cultural background or between different cultures when – they simply 
require that mediations are provided through the dominant Western culture. This paper 
explores this operation of power through an interplay between theory and practice. In 
particular I draw on both the work of Michel Foucault and personal experience as a 
mediator, including involvement with training and related activities. In adopting a 
Foucaultian approach, the paper expands on the previous contributions of George Pavlich 
(1996a; 1996b) and adjusts for the approach taken by Dale Bagshaw (2001). The paper 
draws upon an assumed understanding of facilitative mediation practice and demonstrates 
points by reference to intercultural issues between Aboriginal and non-Indigenous 
Australian peoples.  
Through this approach, it is shown that in intercultural mediations explicit and 
implicit mediator techniques lead disputants to behave and perform their selves in ways 
consistent with the goals of mediation and Western norms around conflict and selfhood. 
The specificity of this analysis means that the findings are indicative and explorative 
rather than comprehensive. Nevertheless, the results highlight the need to consider ways 
in which researchers and mediators can begin to mitigate this operation of power and 
respond to cultural difference in ethical ways. The final section of the paper shows that 
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the very structure and underlying assumptions of contemporary facilitative mediation 
require that we be more circumspect about the postmodern possibility of valuing cultural 
difference in mediation than Bagshaw (2001) allows. For this reason, the paper concludes 
that a long-term process of cultural learning, including elicitive dialogue across cultural 
difference, is necessary to develop processes which respond to different approaches to 
conflict and modes of selfhood. 
 
Conflict, Self and Culture 
The question of normative orientation to conflict is often discussed in primary or 
alternative dispute resolution (ADR) circles, particularly in training courses, with many 
practitioners and advocates of mediation seeing themselves effecting a transformation in 
the orientation of themselves and their clients to conflict. A common view is that we have 
been mistaken in understanding conflict as negative in our interpersonal and societal 
relations, and that there are many positive benefits to be had in engaging positively and 
assertively with conflict. Often practitioners suggest that conflict is normatively neutral 
and that its management is the most important consideration. This in part reflects a shift 
in Western perceptions, beginning in the mid-1950s, within the related field of 
organizational relations. Rather than viewing conflicts as purely detrimental to 
productivity, management consultants and social scientists began to promote the 
possibility that, depending upon how they were handled, disputes could have positive 
effects (Scimecca, 1991, p. 21-22). Similarly, the personal growth or development 
movement of the 1970s highlighted the possibility that disputes can be viewed as 
opportunities for empowerment and personal transformation (Harrington and Merry, 
1988, p. 715-716). Both these fields have significantly influenced the mediation 
movement.  
At face value, these reformist orientations suggest a positive approach toward 
conflict. However, in each case, conflict, and disputes as specific manifestations of 
conflict, are also viewed as blockages to be overcome, as difficult events to move beyond. 
Mediation professionals, for instance, are most satisfied when agreements are completed. 
This accords with the overall aim of mediation and other dispute management or 
resolution processes in Western culture. To take the limit case, mediators see their role, in 
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the main, to manage or resolve rather than to precipitate conflict. Within the 
organizational relations context, conflict is viewed as positive only when it generates 
improved workplace relations or processes. In a similar mode of emphasizing the post-
dispute period, a recent transformative mediation text aims to explore “the ways conflicts 
are miraculously stripped away, revealing the simple, stark beauty of human love and 
kindness” (Cloke, 2001, p. xii). In other words, it is only when conflict has been to some 
extent dispensed with and peace restored that the acknowledgment is made that “conflict 
is positive”. Hence while mediation values engagement with conflict, this is so in order to 
achieve peace; conflict is thus subordinated to peace.  
 Laura Nader locates this phenomenon more broadly in Western culture, 
suggesting that Western cultural upbringing leads to a “strong attachment to harmony 
models” (1991, p. 41). She notes that social science theories “generated in the West 
reflect the belief that conflict is bad and in need of explanation, while its opposite is 
valued behavior that needs no explanation” (1991, p. 41). Psychologist Elton McNeil 
(1965, p. 35) explicitly articulates this orientation in a discussion of aggression. He states 
that “Hostile and aggressive behavior are the most powerful obstacles to the formation of 
a culture which can devote its energies to constructive efforts” (1965, p. 35). This 
orientation to conflict has a long and pervasive presence in Western thought. Since the 
classical Greeks, Western social philosophy has been primarily concerned with the theme 
of social integration, especially how relations between people can be harmonized (Binns, 
1977, p. 175). Of course, this formulation does not hold universally in the West, with one 
tradition in international relations viewing war as an inevitable and sometimes necessary 
extension of politics (for example, see Clausewitz, 1976). Nevertheless, in those circles 
which have given rise to the mediation movement, the attachment to harmony as an end 
goal prevails and many of the West’s internally generated analyses define the 
achievement and maintenance of order and peace as a central problem (Harrison, 1993, p. 
3).  
However, anthropologists show us that this problem does not confront many other 
cultures. As a corollary the orientation to conflict associated with it cannot be 
generalized. Nader (1991, p. 49) reports that “In some Melanesian societies there is a 
tolerance of and even enjoyment of quarreling”. Similarly there are numerous accounts of 
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Aboriginal Australian people fighting because it is enjoyable or entertaining (Macdonald, 
1990; Myers, 1991, p. 160-161; Jarret, 2001, p. 104-105). This is not simply a matter of 
likes and dislikes, but is linked to how interpersonal ties operate and political 
communities form. In a general sense, sociologist Robert Angel (1965, p. 99) suggests 
that “People are willing to become embroiled in conflict if they have no doubt of their 
ultimate cohesion”. More fundamentally though, political communities form and are 
sustained through differing relationships to disputing. In a striking contrast with Western 
cultures, Simon Harrison (1993) shows that for certain peoples in Papua New Guinea, 
interpersonal relationships - not a state of war - are the a priori of social life. In this 
context, violence and conflict are not destructive of society but are one of a number of 
means of forming and maintaining groups. Thus it is “not groups [as in conflicts between 
nations of the West] that give rise to violent encounters but violent encounters which give 
rise to groups” (Harrison 1993, p. 18). In other words, the maintenance of violence and 
conflict substitutes for the maintenance of order and peace in the constitution of society.  
Conflict can also be constitutive in other ways, as Marcia Langton (1988) has 
shown in relation to fighting and swearing by Aboriginal people in the context of 
relations between Indigenous and non-Indigenous Australians. Langton states that public 
swearing and fighting are:  
not deviance and anarchy, as some would have it [- as they might be seen 
through a liberal Western worldview -] but  appropriate rule-governed 
behaviour adapted from earlier indigenous patterns to enable meaningful 
existence in the new political, legal and social situations imposed by the 
dominant Australian regime (1988, p. 202). 
In other words, swearing and fighting can be politically constitutive for Indigenous 
Australians in their relations with police and other authority figures. The challenge of 
these culturally different orientations to conflict is succinctly summarized by Nader 
(1991, p. 45) when she points out that harmony and conflict behaviors are not antithetical 
as Western theories and practices around conflict have implied. As I discuss below, not 
addressing this challenge in the mediation context, leads to serious negative political and 
ethical implications for mediator practice. 
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Different versions of selfhood or subjectivity - the term that theorists substitute 
for commonsense ideas of the self or individual - parallel these culturally differing 
valencies of disputing. Although Westerners usually assume their way of being and 
selfhood as “normal”, Clifford Geertz succinctly draws out the specificity of Western 
personhood. He states that the:  
conception of the person as a bounded unique more or less integrated 
motivational and cognitive universe, a dynamic centre of awareness, 
emotion, judgement and action, organized into a distinctive whole and set 
contrastively against other such wholes and against a social and natural 
background, is, however incorrigible it may seem to us, a rather peculiar 
idea within the context of the world’s cultures (1979, p. 229). 
In contrast, within cultures in which interpersonal ties predominate, selfhood or 
subjectivity is often not skin-bound, and can be located in other persons and in land and 
spirit forms (for example, see Swain, 1993; Rose, 1999, p. 181). In this situation, 
disputing or fighting between individuals may not signal the breaking of social bonds but 
rather their reassertion. Gaynor Macdonald (1990) shows that for Wiradjuri people for 
whom interpersonal ties are crucial, a verbal insult, the casting of aspersions, or even 
being ignored by others, represents a challenge to an individual’s very existence 
including their integrity as a social being. In this situation, everyday Western responses 
such as “turning the other cheek” or otherwise withdrawing to a pre-existing self are 
untenable precisely because that “self” does not exist beyond the relations at hand. 
Repudiation is necessary, hence in this situation fighting back operates as a “reclamation 
of sociality and harmony” (Macdonald, 1990, p. 127). Dispersed subjectivities also 
suggest different approaches to interpersonal politics than do their more self-contained 
Western counterparts. For instance, Deborah Bird Rose shows that for Aboriginal 
Australian people she is involved with, successful politiking “lies in the art of locating 
one’s self in as many contexts as possible” (Rose, 1999, p. 181). She contrasts this with 
“accumulating contexts and collapsing them into a singularity” (1999, p. 181), an 
approach regularly pursued by Westerners attempting to develop personal-political 
standing.  
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These disputing behaviors and their linkage with culturally different versions of 
personhood reinforce Nader’s (1991) point that harmony and conflict behaviors are not 
antithetical as Western theories and practices have suggested. However, in coming to 
terms with this understanding, there is no simple correlation between disputing behavior 
and cultural difference. For instance, a regime of selfhood which gives great importance 
to interpersonal ties and interconnectedness, does not prefigure all interpersonal disputing 
as directed toward the re-asserting of social relations. Fred Myers (1991, p. 159) shows 
that for Pintupi people, fighting can be about sustaining a measure of autonomy within 
the constraints demanded by relatedness. This complexity need not confound our 
response. Rather, as I will show in the last part of this paper, openness to contradiction, 
surprise and paradox offer opportunities for developing and improving mediator practice. 
Thus far I have highlighted the West’s culturally specific orientation to conflict and 
shown that neither it, nor its accompanying version of selfhood, are generalizable, 
natural, or neutral. I now want to consider some of the political implications of these 
assumptions and specifically the operation of power that occurs though them, as they are 
played out in intercultural mediation. First though, I briefly want to identify an 
appropriate conceptual approach to power.  
 
Conceptualizing Power in Mediation 
To explore how power operates through intercultural mediation requires a conceptual 
approach which is not wedded to the culturally specific assumptions discussed so far. The 
work of Michel Foucault is useful in this regard because, contrary to traditional 
approaches to power in the West, he does not begin with the Western understanding of 
the self as an assumed category or entity. Rather, for Foucault, selves are shifting and 
continually redefined in networks of power relations. As he states, “one of the prime 
effects of power [is] that certain bodies, certain gestures, certain discourses, certain 
desires, come to be identified and constituted as individuals. The individual, … [is] one 
of its [power’s] prime effects” (1980, p. 98). Power, then, is also not a commodity, and 
hence individuals and institutions do not hold power. Instead, Foucault focuses on 
relations and exercise of power (1987, p. 11) and the word power used in isolation is 
usually shorthand for this more specific formulation. In general terms, power operates 
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through actions upon both the actions of others and one’s self (Foucault, 1982, p. 220-
221) and these actions continually (re-) constitute who we are. Mediators have been 
previously introduced to Foucault’s work on power, first by George Pavlich (1996a; 
1996b) and more recently by Dale Bagshaw (2001).  
Pavlich (1996a; 1996b) has shown how mediation operates to re-integrate 
disputing individuals into the general community by fashioning non-disputing identities. 
Although Pavlich’s analysis is in many respects comprehensive, especially in his book-
length publication (1996a), the operation of power through intercultural mediation is 
beyond his purview. Thus although Pavlich shows how mediation pressures disputants to 
refashion their subjectivities away from disputing (1996a, pp. 118-129; 1996b, pp. 721-
724), he does not identify the cultural specificity of this shift. Moreover, Pavlich tends to 
focus on the content of presenting selfhoods rather than entertaining that there may be 
differing regimes of selfhood entering the mediation process (see Pavlich, 1996b, p. 726). 
Thus, while this paper parallels some of Pavlich’s arguments, it also complements and 
extends his work. 
Bagshaw’s article usefully identifies the “central function that professionals such 
as social workers, lawyers, and mediators play as points of organization and distribution 
of power and control” (2001, p. 205). Unfortunately and somewhat curiously though, 
Pavlich’s work is not mentioned, and mediators and their everyday practices escape 
analysis. Instead, Bagshaw (2001) identifies an operation of power at work in the 
processes, currently underway in Australia, of definition and classification of mediation, 
and the potential development of standards (see NADRAC, 2001). She notes that 
Foucault would suggest that these processes indicate an operation of power, proceeding 
through “socially exclusive institutions such as universities, courts and government 
departments” (2001, p. 206). To some extent, this is an important observation; Foucault is 
famous for his work in relation to institutions, particularly prisons (see Foucault, 1979). 
However, for Foucault, institutions are simply the sites of emergence for a type of power 
that has subsequently moved throughout the modern Western world. As he states, 
discipline (the type of power he explores) cannot be "identified with an institution nor 
with a particular apparatus" (1979, p. 15). For these reasons, focusing on 
professionalization can mask the wider and more mundane operation of power which is 
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all the more pressing because it easily goes unnoticed in mediation circles. In short, 
Bagshaw’s article identifies important issues and the relevance of Foucault’s work, but 
elides a crucial aspect of the operation of power through mediation and does not build on 
earlier analysis. Having briefly outlined Foucault’s conceptualization of power and the 
literature which has applied it to mediation thus far, I now want to turn to the operation of 
power through everyday facilitative and intercultural mediation processes. The following 
analysis does not claim to represent all intercultural situations, or even the full situation 
in relation to any one intercultural setting - these are explorative and indicative rather 
than comprehensive claims. 
 
The Power of Intercultural Mediation 
 Following Western assumptions about conflict and disputing, conflict and 
violence are widely viewed as destructive practices and modes of subjectivity. Consistent 
with this, the implicit goal of mediation programs is the encouragement and production of 
peaceful, rational, and responsible subjectivities in preference and in a shift from 
conflictual, emotional and combative performances. Because of this outlook, mediation 
programs and processes often have difficulty recognizing and respecting non-Western 
understandings and functions of conflict2. When disputants do not perform the 
subjectivities appropriately (for example, they continue to fight or be emotional without 
demonstrating some shift) mediators and staff of programs tend to respond in two broad 
ways. Sometimes they bring more pressure to bear for disputants to accept responsibility 
for the dispute and be an active agent in resolving it. At other times, they may close down 
the process, speculating that the disputants are beyond help or simply noting that 
mediation cannot work in all cases. In this way, mediation program staff and mediators 
either operate as agents in a Western governing process by disciplining people toward a 
particular norm, or they perpetuate the non-recognition of cultural difference. 
Turning to this operation in more detail, the early stages of a person’s contact 
with a mediation program lay the foundations for the exercise of power in the mediation 
session. A central way in which this occurs is through the separation of disputants from 
broader politics and networks, coupled with a focus on the individual person or group as 
the locus of the dispute and its resolution. As mediators know through experience, the 
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willingness of parties to attempt to resolve the dispute themselves, rather than to locate its 
origins elsewhere, is crucial to a successful mediation. Preparatory discussions with 
disputants reflect this, with the mediator or staff member typically avoiding siding with 
disputants or acting as an advocate in what a disputant may feel is an unfair situation. The 
avoidance of entering into these types of discussion with disputants during the 
preparatory stage reflects a distinction which mediators and other staff members make 
between the “process” and “content” dimensions of the dispute and resolution process. 
Focusing on process, and the avoidance of providing advice, encourages the party to 
accept individual responsibility for the dispute and its resolution. The requirement of 
voluntary participation on the part of disputants also tends to be emphasized in the 
preparatory stage serving to reinforce the point that the mediator cannot solve the dispute, 
only the party can. Reassurances about the confidential nature of the preparatory 
discussions assist this operation by promoting a level of personal openness and 
responsibility that parties to a dispute may not otherwise embrace. 
This partitioning of the dispute from broader political forces and other (for 
exmaple, family and communal) networks, in combination with an emphasis on 
individual responsibility, mark out the terrain for the operation of power in the mediation 
session proper. If the preparatory stages are successful, disputants are less likely to 
interpret their dispute as part a broader social issue relating to race, culture, gender, class, 
power and so on. Instead, they will tend to be focused on their role in the dispute and 
what they can possibly do in mediation to resolve it. Putting to one side the broad social 
justice implications of this operation, such a process has striking cultural inflections. 
These include the promotion of the Western type of selfhood specified by Geertz to the 
exclusion of a dispersed subjectivity which emphasizes interconnectedness including the 
importance of family and community. The promotion of less emotive responses, which 
continues throughout the mediation session proper and which I discuss in more detail 
below, also reinforces a Western approach thereby undermining ways of approaching 
conflict which give substantial importance to affect or emotion.    
The introduction to the mediation process typically recapitulates many of the 
points covered in the preparation phase, emphasizing voluntary attendance, willingness to 
act to resolve the dispute, and agreement to be guided by the mediators in the mediation 
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process. As part of these introductions, emphasis is placed on mediator control over the 
procedural issues, and party control over substantive or content issues. This, along with 
assurances that mediators do not make value judgments, serves (paradoxically) to assure 
participants that the mediation process is apolitical and to establish a basis for mediators 
to exercise power. The scene for more explicit operations of power later in the process 
can also be set at this stage through the establishment of groundrules or guidelines which 
the parties voluntarily agree too. These are usually aimed at maintaining a controlled, 
non-violent interaction. The opening contribution by parties to the mediation session 
involves them explaining the concerns which have brought them to mediation or, in other 
commonly-used terms, telling their (side of the) story. Parties are required to do so within 
certain constraints which typically include taking turns, not interrupting each other, not 
attacking the other person, and not talking for excessively long periods. 
This story-telling begins a process of self-examination in relation to, and 
reconciliation with, an external order which operates throughout the mediation session.  
Foucault (1981) terms this process the “confession” and identifies it as a practice which, 
since the Middle Ages, has become increasingly pervasive in Western society (1981, p. 
58-61). He is interested in the confession as a technique of the self (or practice of 
subjectivity) in which the individual confesses his or her emotions, thoughts, and desires 
to an external body or authority. The process of telling “opens” the individual and effects 
a process of self-work (re-evaluating thoughts, behaviors, actions and overall way of 
being). As Foucault states, the confession “produces intrinsic modifications in the person 
who articulates it: it exonerates, redeems, and purifies him; it unburdens him of his 
wrongs, liberates him and promises him salvation” (1981, p. 62). In linking with the goals 
and governing processes of the state, much contemporary confessing is directed toward 
ensuring a form of secular salvation (Foucault, 1982, p. 215) through peace, health, 
standard of living and so on. The fact that the confession frequently has redeeming 
effects accounts for why Westerners have become much practiced at, and in many 
respects addicted to, confessing. It is for this reason that the process of story-telling can 
be highly valued by mediation participants as an opportunity to “have their say” and 
thereby achieve some measure of justice. It is also why storytelling is often noted as 
“unique and even magical” in mediation circles (Gunning, 1995, p. 68).  
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However, Foucault also demonstrates that power relations are intrinsic to the 
confessional: “one does not confess without the presence (or virtual presence) of a 
partner who is not simply the interlocutor but the authority who requires the confession, 
prescribes and appreciates it, and intervenes in order to judge, punish, forgive, console 
and reconcile” (, 1981, pp. 61-62). Foucault is not suggesting that we force confessions 
from people, or at least not in many cases, and nor is he making a generalization that the 
power that operates through the confession is necessarily bad. Rather, most confessions 
are voluntary – making them valuable to generate processes of self-work – and he 
explicitly resists normative judgments about the operation of power. To evaluate the 
effects of any particular operation of power requires, for Foucault, consideration on a 
case-by-case basis. 
In the mediation process, the mediator serves as the figure to whom the diputant 
confesses, and as the one who specifies the parameters for confessing. The parameters 
may be indicated explicitly (as in the case of groundrules for telling of stories) or 
implicitly. Isabelle Gunning (1995, p. 68) highlights the latter in relation to telling of 
stories by arguing that in this process narratives “must interact or compete for legitimacy 
or primacy”. This means that in considering how they may present their story, parties will 
“craft their stories in relation to other pre-existing stories and cultural myths with which 
all the participants, parties and mediators are familiar” (1995, p. 68). In other words, 
there is pressure on disputants to perform their stories and selves in ways understandable 
to the mediators and intelligible within the goals of the mediation session and 
accompanying assumptions about peace and conflict. Although the cathartic value of 
story-telling is often emphasized, and a relatively high level of emotion is tolerated in 
comparison with other parts of the process, strongly conflictual and combative 
approaches are discouraged regardless of the role that these may play for non-Western 
cultures.  
From the story-telling phase onward, facilitative mediation processes typically 
take the form of an extended confessional in which the Western approach to conflict and 
selfhood is encouraged, promoted and reinforced through power exercised by the 
mediators. This occurs through a number of techniques. Depending upon process 
variation and mediator style, disputants may face coaching about appropriate 
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communication styles, mini-lectures on ways of relating more positively, direct rebukes 
for how they are behaving, or the invocation of groundrules set at the beginning of the 
session. However, perhaps the most important technique, which serves as a theme for 
mediation sessions, is reframing. Conceived in a broad sense, reframing involves shifting 
the attitude or orientation of parties. At its most subtle, it can involve paraphrasing anger 
and other emotion which parties express in a calm and steady voice, serving as a 
demonstration that such matters can and should be handled in a particular way. In its 
more direct forms, reframing involves choosing not to paraphrase or emphasize certain 
aspects of dialogue thereby signaling them as inappropriate, suggesting agenda items in 
“neutral” terms, diffusing personal attacks and directing a party to address a shared 
problem, and redirecting discussion from surface level positions to underlying interests. 
The use of reframing throughout the mediation process acts on parties through subtle 
injunctions, inducements and rewards. For instance, if an emotional or accusatory 
statement from one party to another is reframed by a mediator and the party subsequently 
adopts a more conciliatory tone, mediator intervention will be relaxed signaling 
appropriate behavior by the party.  Conversely, if a party ignores a reframe, more 
reframes will be necessary signaling disapproval with the exchange. If the party does not 
follow these up, other stronger interventions may be called for. In this way, reframing 
encourages parties to reposition themselves as rational rather than emotional, constructive 
rather than destructive, conciliatory rather than combative. These repositionings, 
culminating in an agreement if the process is successful, embody Western presumptions 
about conflict thereby reintroducing harmony and training individuals in how such 
matters should be dealt with in the future in alignment with Western community norms.  
Throughout this process, the most powerful operations of power occur through 
culturally specific expectations which sit alongside this broad requirement for a shift 
from combative to peaceful subjectivities. Most closely related is the expectation that 
people should deal with disputes in a rational rather than emotional way. This is not to 
suggest that emotions are simply ignored or disavowed in mediation. Rather, they are 
dealt with in a particularly way, usually by separating people from the problem as 
popularized by Fisher, Ury and Patton (1999, pp. 17-40). The most standard formulation 
here is that emotional outbursts serve to clear the air or let off steam making “it easier to 
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talk rationally later” (1999, p. 31). The logic of the confessional is at play here also. 
Again Fisher, Ury and Patton (1999, p. 31) state this succinctly: “Freed from the burden 
of unexpressed emotions, people will become more likely to work on the problem”. 
Within this expectation then, it is assumed that people’s emotions can be separated from 
the problem, and that cognitive-rational rather than emotional behaviors are the 
appropriate ways to deal with problems. However, selfhood in some cultures does not 
prioritize cognition, nor separate and compartmentalize it in relation to other experiences. 
Niko Besnier (1990, p. 420) points out that “ethnographic work on emotions has shown 
that the oppostion between cognition and emotion is a Western construct”. For many 
other cultures “emotions and social life are intricately interwoven, which immediately 
sheds some doubt on the validity of a sharp dividing line between the social and the 
affective” (1990, p. 431). In fact, many people may “undergo” events and emotions rather 
than “feeling” or “experiencing” them. In mediation the reframing techniques discussed 
above (for instance, paraphrasing which eliminates or dispenses with emotion) encourage 
parties to deal with issues rationally rather than emotionally thereby promoting a 
culturally specific technique of the self and regime of selfhood.  
Consistent with the expectation that disputants will deal with issues in a rational 
rather than emotional way, their performances are also expected to be relatively 
“coherent” – that is, able to be readily understood through Western rationality. In 
mediation circles, this is commonly framed through the notion that participants have 
underlying interests which are consistent and relatively stable. However, this expectation 
conflicts with Rose’s account of the fluidity of subjectivity and the process of locating 
oneself in multiple contexts. Rose (2000, p. 172) notes that in conflict situations she has 
observed, Aboriginal people can be involved in “shifting identities, and shifting contexts, 
sometimes with overwhelming speed and agility”. Such behavior may be interpreted by 
mediators who are focused on interests as “shifts in position”, resulting in attempts to 
keep parties to agenda items, or fashion “coherent” stories of parties’ motivations and 
behaviors.  
In a similar way, the logic of the confession suggests that motivations for 
negotiating positions and behaviors should be present and able to be articulated by 
individuals. However the interconnectedness of social relations and selfhood which 
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characterize many non-Western cultures means that family and communal relations often 
play a larger role than for Western people. This may mean that individuals are not in a 
position to articulate “interests” outside the context of broader relationships. Nor can it be 
assumed that it is possible to include or represent all contexts within the mediation 
setting. For instance, Aboriginal Australian people are often required to observe protocols 
about disclosing knowledge in certain settings or in the presence of certain people. 
Gaynor Macdonald (1990, pp. 128-129) has shown that even attempts to understand the 
basis of disputes may clash with the social order of Wiradjuri people that she has been 
involved with. To do so may expose contradictions in social relations which Wiradjuri 
prefer to keep covered as part of maintaining a viable community and knowable social 
order. Macdonald points out that the question, often asked by non-Indigenous people, 
“What do they fight about?”, assumes that fights have explicable causes (reasons, 
motivations, and interests) and that these can enable an understanding and evaluation of a 
fight. However, Wiradjuri do not share this approach and, in contrast to the approach 
pursued through the confessional, there is little soul-searching or inquiry into people’s 
reasons or motives for fighting (1990, pp. 129-130). Framed in the language of 
mediation, the result of this different approach to conflict is that mediators can be faced 
with a situation in which parties are not forthcoming about their interests. In response, 
mediators are usually trained to “draw out” parties’ “underlying” issues and interests 
consistent with the logic of the confession. In these circumstances, a variety of outcomes 
can result, one of which is that participants perform according to the requirements of the 
mediators and this process. (I mention other possibilities below.) In this case an operation 
of power is effected through a culturally specific conceptualization of conflict and self.  
These operations of power may not be immediately apparent to mediators or 
participants. This is because in many settings Western norms around conflict predominate 
to the extent that they appear natural, because these operations of power take place within 
the redemptive framework of the confessional, and because reframing operates in a subtle 
way. Even when other less subtle techniques, such as direct rebukes and the invocation of 
groudrules, are employed, the fact that mediators de-politicize their involvement by 
emphasizing their focus on procedural issues serves to mask the operation of power. 
However, regardless of whether reframing or more direct techniques are employed, 
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participants are encouraged to reform their subjectivities in a peaceful direction aligning 
with Western assumptions about conflict and selfhood. In sum, if participants in 
mediation perform in ways that are amenable to mediators and the process, they will, 
among other things, tend to use peace and agreement rather than conflict to define 
themselves and their relations with others, and they will formulate individual interests in 
transparent, complete and coherent ways.  
However, following Foucault’s agonistic and relational conceptualization of 
power, neither the enactment of these techniques, nor their efficacy, are assured. 
Disputants do not always perform subjectivities in accordance with the mediation process 
or the mediators’ wishes. Participants ignore and modify as well as perform the 
prescribed practices of self-regulation and transformation. For instance, the use of 
fighting and swearing identified by Langton (1988) can be played out in mediation in 
disregard of groundrules, participants may not readily follow agendas, and some parties 
do not formalize points of agreement in the explicit ways that mediation processes 
encourage. In short, although there is often no explicit engagement with non-Western 
practices in typical facilitative mediation, parties sometimes use mediation sessions as a 
site to play out their own patterns. In response to such experiences, mediators also 
sometimes modify standard mediation processes in recognition of non-Western ways of 
operating. This indicates the interplay of forces and traditions signaling that the 
operations of power discussed so far is not entirely stable and that it is possible to 
ameliorate and change them. Nevertheless, because of the predominance of Western 
cultural norms in the operation of most mediation programs, this possibility needs to be 
fought for in order to ethically come to terms with cultural difference. To not do this 
reinforces Western values as universal thereby disavowing and disrespecting other 
worldviews and lifeways.  
 
Implications for Research and Practice 
 The broadest implication of the above discussion is the need, often presented as 
part of a postmodern promise deriving from the work of Foucault and others (see 
Bagshaw, 2001), to develop ways of valuing cultural difference in mediation. The 
suggestion here is that a variety of modes of subjectivity and approaches to conflict are 
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equally valuable for people to maintain their social relations and make their way of being 
in the world. Some may counter that mediation programs in Western communities should 
reflect Western conceptions so that the order and integrity of these societies in ensured. 
However, this objection (again) reflects Western assumptions about conflict and the 
possibilities for formation of political communities; specifically that community forms 
through sameness and consensus. To explore this issue in detail is beyond the scope of 
this paper. Suffice to say that a number of contemporary political theorists are exploring 
the possibility that political communities – including those in the West - can and do form 
through difference and dissensus (see Nancy, 1991; Lingis, 1994; Secomb, 2000). How 
then, can researchers and mediators begin to thoroughly value difference given the above 
discussion which has drawn out Western assumptions about conflict and selfhood and the 
accompanying operation of power through facilitative intercultural mediation?  
 First, caution is necessary. Drawing upon a Foucaultian approach is a useful for 
developing critical analyses, and can point to ways of valuing cultural difference. Some 
of the latter possibilities emerge in Bagshaw’s list of goals for the postmodernist 
mediator (2001, pp. 217-218). However, the rapidity and ease with which these might be 
put into practice, and the extent to which they are compatible with contemporary Western 
mediation practice, is less certain. Considering some of the possibilities articulated by 
Bagshaw (2001) demonstrates this. For instance, Bagshaw states, but does not 
substantiate, that through mediation “we have the opportunity to understand the stories 
and themes that have shaped a person’s life and the degree to which the normalizing 
power of dominant discourses have included, excluded, or marginalized people” (2001, p. 
216). However, as has been shown in this article, mediation itself is a normalizing 
process which promotes a particular selfhood and embodies the values and approaches to 
conflict of dominant Western society. Bagshaw’s (2001) treatment of the formation of 
identities through mediation is similarly problematic. She suggests that we should “place 
emphasis on allowing people to construct their own identity within the mediation” (2001, 
p 218). However, this ignores that self-work never occurs in a vacuum - never outside 
networks of relations of power. The closest Bagshaw comes to indicating how this 
process might occur is when she draws on the work of Michael White and the idea of 
narrative selves. She suggests that “separating people from the problem and encouraging 
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them to provide an account of the effects of the problem on their life and on their 
interactions with others leaves them free to explore alternative and preferred knowledge 
about who they might be” (2001, p. 216).  However, as I have discussed, separating 
people from the problem is a long-standing technique in Western ADR theory and 
practice which is directly linked to the regime of subjectivity which predominates in the 
West. This means that the above maxim may be appropriate for a relatively autonomous 
and self-contained thinking unit. However, again as I have indicated, there are political 
implications attached to assuming this approach when a person cannot be so readily 
separated from the problem.  
Similarly, the suggestion that encouraging disputants to provide an account of the 
effects of a problem on their life “leaves them free” to explore alternative and preferred 
knowledge about who they might be, creates a false sense of a zone of freedom. A more 
likely scenario is that such encouragement would allow the telling of versions of selfhood 
which are compatible with a Western subjectivity as promoted in mediation processes. 
This in turn may result in variations on the Western theme which places a substantial 
limitation on who people might be. At the least, mediation enforces, more or less 
strongly, certain parameters around the role and meaning that conflict can have in 
people’s lives and therefore in the formation of their subjectivity. Thus, we need to be 
cautious about putting too much store in the capacity of contemporary Western mediation 
for risk of undermining the possibilities for substantial valuation of difference. This is not 
to dismiss the possibilities identified by Bagshaw (2001) – indeed searching out these 
possibilities is crucial to ethical and professional mediator practice. However, to find 
ways in which cultural difference can be thoroughly valued in mediation requires more 
research on topics such how power currently operates to construct subjectivities in 
intercultural mediation. Although a start has been made on these tasks in this paper, the 
explorative and indicative arguments begun here require further research to more fully 
understand the challenges we face.  
Turning to mediator practice and the provision of intercultural mediation services, 
there is a need for increased awareness about the political nature of mediation. Following 
from the discussion in this paper, service providers need to be made aware that 
facilitative mediation practice embodies specifically Western views of conflict and 
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selfhood, and that it effects an operation of power which has significant political 
implications for mediation involving people of non-Western cultural background. The 
inclusion of such perspectives in mediation training programs would be a useful antidote 
to the often-uncritical enthusiasm with which many new recruits to the field adopt 
mediation. In this process and in the proposals below, mediators of non-Western 
backgrounds could play a very active role. Moving beyond the need for increased 
awareness again requires caution as it would be presumptuous to attempt to address the 
issues raised so far by closely specifying abilities, skills and knowledge that mediators 
should acquire. This is because we are only at the early stages of undertaking the sorts of 
analyses conducted above. However, it is possible to identify a broad orientation to 
facilitate our learning, and a number of more specific possibilities that suggest areas for 
research, process development, and mediator training.  
In seeking to understand cultural assumptions about behavior and being at play in 
disputing, Peter Black (1991, pp. 145-146) makes use of a combination of self-awareness, 
introspection, and perhaps most importantly, a capacity to be surprised. Black makes the 
fundamental point that when our assumptions fail to predict or explain action and 
behavior there is an opportunity for surprise and learning. The aim of developing this 
type of orientation is not to generate new explanatory or predictive knowledge, or to 
know culture in a comprehensive way (regarding problems with this approach, see 
Avruch, 1998). Rather, the aim is to be "attentive to the unknown that knocks at the door" 
(Deleuze, 1992, p. 165). This allows that ongoing and flexible learning might occur 
which does not assume unchanging ways of dealing with conflict and being in the world. 
The challenge within this disarmingly simple suggestion is to suspend one’s assumptions 
and to make one’s self vulnerable by accepting the cultural specificity and limitations of 
one’s own knowledge and mode of selfhood. (Part of the aim of this paper has been to 
articulate some different understandings of conflict and conceptions of selfhood, and 
thereby surprise some readers). 
Drawing upon this orientation, trainers and mediators can challenge themselves 
by reflecting upon cultural difference. One aspect of this necessarily occurs through the 
development of cultural and conflict literacy which can be pursued through contact with 
people from different cultural backgrounds or by making use of academic papers, 
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literature, poetry and artwork. However, equally important as this somewhat external 
focus, is the need to develop self-awareness of the specificity of one’s own culture 
including its dominant mode of selfhood and orientation to conflict. This is particularly 
important for people of Western background because the dominance of Western norms 
means that culturally specific traits are often perceived as normal or universal and 
thereby rendered invisible. These two types of learning can be leveraged against one 
another so that surprise about aspects of another culture’s orientation to conflict can lead 
to surprise and insights about one’s own culture and vice versa. This process should yield 
recognition that the standard assumptions and bases of facilitative mediation do not hold 
universally. It should therefore militate against interpreting parties’ behavior through 
“commonsense” understandings of “appropriate” or “sensible” or “rational” behavior, 
and hence through particular versions of selfhood. Instead, attempts to understand why 
parties may be behaving in particular ways should incite consideration of forces and 
contexts operating on parties which may not be understood by or available to mediators 
and teachers, and a new round of learning.  
This type of knowledge and learning can be used to develop and improve 
mediation and other dispute processing methods because it opens the possibility for 
working with disputants to design or “grow” processes out of their context(s), 
worldview(s), knowledge(s), and so on. In terms used by John Paul Lederach (1995, p. 
85-107), this reflects an “elicitive” (or dialogic) rather than “prescriptive” approach. In 
place of imparting knowledge or delivering a pre-established process, the core aim in an 
elicitive dialogue is drawing on people’s local and in-context cultural knowledge. There 
are no clear guidelines about how this should proceed as the development of intercultural 
elicitive dialogue is in its infancy. However, the broad outline of how to elicit ways of 
dealing with conflict for particular intercultural contexts should become apparent through 
development of the type of knowledge suggested above. The types of changes from 
standard facilitative mediation which might be generated through this process are clearly 
varied, and in some instances an elicitive dialogue may simply highlight the 
inappropriateness of using a mediation-type process. Here though, I want to note a 
number of possible divergences from standard facilitative mediation which might emerge 
through elicitive dialogue: 
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• Agendas, and technical and analytical language may be eliminated reflecting 
the importance of poetic, affective, metaphorical and non-linear 
understandings and stories as ways of dealing with conflict. 
• Emotional and spiritual spheres may be integral to the mediation rather than 
being viewed as additional factors or problems to move beyond. 
• Apparently “external” political and social contexts may enter into the 
mediation process. For instance, the “mediation” may not occur as a discrete 
process but could be part of a broader facilitated negotiation process which 
may include visits to individuals’ or families’ homes.  
• It may not be expected that parties will be consistent in their contributions to 
the mediation process. 
• Mediators may become more personally involved with the parties than 
traditional notions of professionalism and neutrality suggest. 
• Disputes may not be finalized. 
These are necessarily tentative suggestions because their appropriateness cannot be 
evaluated outside an elicitive dialogue which needs to be developed in particular 
intercultural settings. Similarly, the extent to which such changes mitigate a West-
dominated operation of power cannot be claimed in advance. In this sense, the proposals 
advanced here do not offer certainty or simple answers to the politics of intercultural 
mediation practice. However, they do offer the possibility for intercultural learning, and 
opportunities for different ways of relating and being for mediators and participants.  
The suggestions advanced so far focus predominantly on awareness of the 
operation of power discussed in the previous section, and on the development of 
processes of elicitive intercultural dialogue. These processes respond to both to the 
current state of play in mediation and to postmodern suggestions about the importance of 
local and particular contexts. While they are therefore more likely to yield ethical 
outcomes than ideas or suggestions from a particular context, it may be useful to offer 
some illustrative ideas about the behavioral and procedural changes that postmodern 
intercultural mediators might adopt. To address the issues raised in this paper, a mediator 
may: 
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• Allow that mediation be a site for the production of meaning through conflict as well 
as a site for the amelioration and management of conflict. This may involve greater 
acceptance of (including resisting intervening into) outbursts of anger and similar 
behaviors. Outbursts can signal important boundaries and the fault lines of (currently) 
irreconcilable differences which speak to participants’ identities and political 
orientations. To attempt to address these can violate participants’ perspectives and 
undermine political and personal goals they may be pursuing both through and 
beyond mediation.   
• Experiment with personal sensibilities that develop literacy with a variety of modes of 
dealing with conflict. What positive roles, for instance, might the expression of anger 
and the playing out of conflicts through anger play in relations between people? This 
is useful because overly earnest mediators can themselves become subjects of 
mediation discipline, with the attendant risk of adopting a universally conciliatory 
approach to conflict at the expense of other ways of operating. Developing such 
sensibilities increases awareness of the variety of subjectivities that people might 
bring to mediation thus providing a basis to avoid subjecting them to the normalizing 
and ordering strains of mediation which emerge through its implicit orientation to 
conflict. 
• Allow subjectivities to combine or fragment in ways contrary to those either 
advocated by or accepted in standard mediation practice. For instance, in some cases 
it may be more ethical to allow that the person and the problem are one, rather than 
attempting to separate the inseparable. This allows recognition of the integral nature 
that emotion and affect may play for some people, and mitigates the extent to which 
participants’ subjectivities are available for dissection by mediators. At other times, it 
may be appropriate to allow subjectivities to fragment rather than combine. For 
example, rather than valuing consistent and coherent performances by participants, it 
may be appropriate to accept that a person’s behaviors will change throughout a 
session because of different contexts coming into operation.  
• Be aware that participation by previously excluded groups (for example, Indigenous 
people, youth, and women) is not sufficient basis to ensure ethical practice. Involving 
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people, for instance, in setting their own does not address the operation of power 
which occurs through the process of organizing interactions in this way. 
• Experiment with different conversational and organizing structures. This can include 
resisting ordering strategies drawn from one tradition or heritage and experimentation 
with non-standard approaches. For instance, it may be useful to abolish the use of 
agendas and instead make use of place, story, precedent or other means for organizing 
and structuring interactions between people. 
• Accept that the mediation process is not neutral and suspect its transformative 
potential. The process can appear humanistic but within this humanism, the 
transformations generated can reflect values and norms about self and conflict that are 
historically and culturally specific.  
• Experiment with identifying the normalizing processes of mediation in a dialogue 
with participants. For example, identify phases of the mediation process being used 
which might be problematic for participants, acknowledge that participants may want 
to operate in a different way, and seek – and be responsive to – their input.  
• De-professionalise. Being formal, professional, and avoiding being affected by 
people’s emotions are not neutral behaviors. Within the limits of impartiality, 
mediators can experiment with allowing themselves to be affected by people’s 
situations, emotions, difficulties and frustrations, and with linking personally and 
building relationships with participants.  
While these suggestions can help to mitigate the operation of power identified in this 
paper, it should be remembered that they are drawn from a particular context, and that 
they are ideas and experiments rather than proven principles of mediation practice. They 
are also not proposed as a program for change, but as a partial antidote to aspects of 
modernist mainstream mediation practice, and as insights for the further development of 
facilitative mediation.  
 
Conclusion 
The claim that mediators and mediation adopt a positive approach to conflict belies a 
more fundamental subordination of conflict to peace in the West. Associated with this is 
a focus on the maintenance of peace rather than conflict, and a culturally specific version 
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of selfhood or subjectivity. These are not cultural universals, and their manifestation in 
facilitative intercultural mediation effects an operation of power that is frequently not 
apparent to mediators or clients. Michel Foucault’s conceptualization of power is 
valuable for revealing this operation because it does not assume that the Western version 
of selfhood is fixed, and it allows that power operates subtly, including through the 
redemptive process of participants confessing details of their dispute. Within mediation 
processes, the combination of the confession and the technique of reframing, or gently 
shifting the orientation and attitude of the parties, promotes a culturally-specific process 
of self-work by the participants. This process does not recognize non-Western approaches 
to conflict and versions of selfhood and, if successful, subordinates these to non-Western 
ways of being and relating.  
Awareness of this operation of power, and further research to develop the 
explorative and indicative analysis presented here, is necessary as a basis for realizing the 
postmodern possibility of valuing cultural difference in mediation. This cautious 
approach is warranted because many of the basic operating assumptions of mediation as 
it is currently practiced are culturally specific and militate against recognition of cultural 
difference. The early stage of understanding and analysis in this area does not allow close 
specification of how mediators should deal with these issues or how mediation processes 
should be changed. Nevertheless, a willingness to question fundamental Western 
assumptions, a capacity to be surprised, and elicitive dialogue across cultural difference 
all hold promise for intercultural learning and developing processes which respond to 
different approaches to conflict and modes of selfhood. 
 
Endnotes 
 
1 I wish to thank two anonymous Conflict Resolution Quarterly reviewers, Roland Bleiker, Toby Ganley, 
Lyndon Murphy and Matt McDonald for helpful comments on an earlier version. I also want to thank 
numerous co-mediators, particularly Charlie Watson and Sandy Harris, for sharing their experience. 
2 Here I am again drawing upon my experience as a mediator, including involvement with preparing people 
in dispute for mediation. 
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